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Globalization and the Border: Trade, Labor, Migration,
and Agricultural Production in Mexico
Chantal Thomas*
The debate over immigration policy in the United States has reached a
crescendo in recent years, with particular concern over illegal workers and their
impact on social well-being in this country. Yet in the prevailing analysis of this
issue, the relationship between immigration and contemporary international trade
policy is often overlooked. In particular, few commentators recognize or
understand that a significant part of the surge in illegal labor from Mexico-the
source of the majority of undocumented workers in the United States-stems
from reforms that Mexico undertook in cooperation with the United States to
liberalize trade flows across the Mexico-United States border.
This Article seeks to elucidate that relationship by focusing on a particular
example: agricultural production in Mexico, especially the production of corn,
the staple crop of Mexican farmers. Since 1994, the following interrelationship
between international trade rules, labor, and migration has unfolded across the
Mexico-United States border: first, corn imports have surged into Mexico from
the United States under import policy reforms brought about by the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and related economic liberalizations
in Mexico; and, second, displaced agricultural labor has migrated out of rural
Mexico into Mexican cities, maquiladoras, and, not infrequently, the United
States.
This Article recounts the particulars of NAFTA-induced corn import surges
from the U.S. across the border to Mexico delving into the specifics within the
broader context of liberalization. Part I describes the background of
macroeconomic reform in Mexico; Part H discusses that reform in the context of
labor relations in Mexico; Part III describes the impact of these transformative
forces on labor migration; Part IV illustrates the cumulative effect of these events
on local maize production; and Part V concludes the Article by summarizing the
general and specific dynamics at play in liberalization and production across the
Mexico-U.S. border, with associated effects on cross-border migration.

* Chantal Thomas, Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. I am indebted to Dan Badelescu for alerting
me to this important case study. Special thanks to Professors Michael Malloy and Ruth Jones, and their
colleagues at McGeorge School of Law, for inviting me to take part in their Annual Distinguished Speaker
Series. A version of this paper was presented at the conference, "Mapping Social Regionalism," convened by
McGill University Faculty of Law and the Centre de Recherche Interuniversitaire sur le Mondialisation et le
Travail (CRIMT); that paper has been published as "Migration and Social Regionalism: Labour Migration as an
Unintended Consequence of Globalization in Mexico, 1980-2000," in SOCIAL REGIONALISM IN THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY (Adelle Blackett & Christian Levesque eds., 2009). Finally, this Article could not have been
completed without the excellent and tireless assistance of the student editors of the McGeorge Law Review.
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I. TRADE LIBERALIZATION SETS THE BACKGROUND:
MACROECONOMIC REFORM IN MEXICO

The trade liberalization undertaken in the NAFTA era should be understood
against a backdrop of a decade's worth of calls for economic reform in Mexico,
away from a statist, inward-looking orientation model and towards a marketized,
outward-looking growth model. The policies on trade between Mexico and the
United States under NAFTA represented the culmination, rather than the
beginning, of an extended set of economic reforms whose genesis lay well over a
decade beforehand. In many cases, these reforms were adopted in fits and starts,
with periods of backtracking followed by sudden and aggressive measures.
Mexico made several changes to its domestic legal and administrative
framework that were not captured formally in NAFTA but that were a central
part of a framework for neoclassical economic reform. It changed its
constitutional law to allow for the alienation of rural property.' It decreased
public spending, causing a shrinkage not only of the public sector but also of the
formal economy, which led to a rise in both the informal economy and in the
incidence of poverty. And it changed its monetary policy, hiking interest rates,
which discouraged local firms from investing and contributed to the stagnation of
the local economy.3 Furthermore, Mexico devalued its currency, leading to a
greater desire for hard currency and increasing the attractiveness of migration
and the possibility of remittances of hard currency.4 When coupled with the

1. See HEATHER L. WILLIAMS, THE TRANSFORMATION OF RURAL MEXICO: REFORMING THE EJIDO
SECTOR (Cornelius & Myhre ed., 1998).

2.

See infra Part I.B; see also Thomas J. Kelly, Neoliberal Reforms and Rural Poverty, 28 LATIN AM.

PERSPECTIVES 84, 84 (2001) (arguing that a "reduction in expenditure of social services" was associated with a

"decline in real wage rates" and "increased poverty"; Manuel Pastor & Carol Wise, State Policy, Distribution
and NeoliberalReform in Mexico, 29 J. LATIN AM. STUDIES 419 (1997). While the reduction in social spending
was associated with a decline in real wages and an increase in poverty, the direct link between the size of the
formal economy and poverty levels is a subject of some dispute in the literature. Neoclassical or neoliberal
perspectives would argue that deregulating the economy can create opportunities for private-sector economic
growth, while other perspectives hold that a stronger "welfare state" model is necessary to ensure income
stability and preserve infrastructural capacity for economic growth. These debates, and the conceptual
difficulties associated with them, are set forth in LINKING THE FORMAL AND INFORMAL ECONOMY: CONCEPTS

AND POLICIES (2006). Some studies have found that, when social security benefits are not taken into account,
informal sector wages may be higher in Mexico, though not in other Latin American countries. See Douglas
Marcouiller, Veronica Ruiz de Castilla & Christopher Woodruff, Formal Measures of the Informal-Sector
Wage Gap in Mexico, El Salvador,and Peru, 45 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE, 367, 376-77 (1997).
3. See Rudiger Dornbusch, Jose Vinals & Richard Portes, Mexcio: Stabilization, Debt and Growth, 3
ECON. POL'Y 233, 261-262 (1988) (noting that high interest rate policies intended to discourage inflation and
thereby "stabilize" the economy can adversely impact economic growth; "stopping inflation[] is the easy part
... monetary[] austerity cools down domestic demand and, accordingly, there is little incentive to invest ... the
high real interest ratesfavour postponing investment") (emphasis added); see also Marco Del Negro & Francec
Obiols-Horns, Has Monetary Policy Been So Bad That It Is Better to Get Rid of It? The Case of Mexico, 33 J.
MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 404 (2001).

4. See Douglas S. Massey & Kristin E. Espinosa, What's Driving Mexico-U.S. Migration? A
Theoretical,Empiricaland Policy Analysis, 102 AM. J. SOC. 939, 948-949 (1997). Though the authors also note
that peso devaluation may in some cases decrease the likelihood of taking "an initial undocumented trip" from
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accelerated liberalization of corn imports into the United States, the result was a
collapse in corn imports, a crowding out of small producers, and a stream of
economic migration.
A. The Washington Consensus and Economic Governance in Mexico
The initial phase of Mexico's reform was significant not only for the country
itself but also for the international economic order. Mexico's economic crisis
provoked a series of substantive and institutional changes in the domain of
international relations that would shape trade, financial, and development policy
for well over a decade: the rise of the Washington Consensus and the move
towards "deeper integration" of the developing world into the international
economic order through the reconciliation of developing-countries' governments
to a model of economic liberalization.5
As many have chronicled, the Mexican debt crisis ushered in a period of
close cooperation between the U.S. government (primarily acting through the
Treasury), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank-all
central arbiters of the waves of refinancing and restructuring of the debt burdens
of Mexico and many other developing countries in the 1980s and 1990s. These
actors became known not only for their actual role in brokering debt restructuring
but for their increasingly cohesive role as advisors for economic policy reform.
For Mexico, the most decisive factor leading to internal economic policy
reform was its 1982 debt crisis, when Mexico's short-term quarterly debt, owed
primarily to private commercial banks, reached record levels at a rapid incline,6
with overall external debt at forty-nine percent. This sudden crisis arose out of a
confluence of factors including lower foreign exchange earnings (due to a
weakening world commodities market and falling oil prices) and more expensive
interest payments (caused by rapid and recent increases in international interest
rates and shortening of loan maturities).
The cost increase provoked the Mexican government to declare a moratorium
on external debt in late 1982, followed by a rapid response from the international
community to reschedule the debt to preserve the stability and viability of the
international financial system. These banks had provided large amounts of

Mexico to the U.S. by increasing the cost of the prices such migrants pay to migrant-smugglers. Id. at 962
(emphasis added).
5. See generally STEPHAN HAGGARD, DEVELOPING NATIONS AND THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL
INTEGRATION (1995) (providing an explanation of the process of "deep integration" in developing countries).
6. See Edward F. Buffie, Mexico 1958-86: From Stabilizing Development to the Debt Crisis, in
DEVELOPING-COUNTRY DEBT AND THE WORLD ECONOMY 141, 152-53 (Jeffrey D. Sachs ed., 1989) (denoting
the doubling of short-term debt between 1978 and 1981); see also FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE
CORPORATION, HISTORY OF THE EIGHTIES - LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE 205 n.38 (1997) (estimating the increase
of interest payments for developing countries as a group as rising from $15.8 billion to $41.1 billion).
7. Rudiger Dombusch & Alejandro Werner, Mexico: Stabilization, Reform, and No Growth, 1
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. AcTIvrrY 253, 256 (1994).
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funding to the Mexican government throughout the 1970s, primarily as a
convenient way of recycling "petrodollar" deposits, and many had heavy
exposures in sovereign loans.8
The IMF played a central role not only in disbursing immediate funds to
relieve the crisis but also in brokering the larger debt restructuring process. This
broker's role included both physically shepherding along the negotiations 9 and
devising the basics of the collective refinancing scheme followed by the
commercial banks.'0 This latter role began in mid-November, 1982, when the
IMF Managing Director informed the banks that the IMF would release funds to
Mexico only if the banks all promised to provide new "gap financing" as well."
As manager of the debt crisis, the IMF was able to persuade commercial
banks to act collectively, because it could deliver two essential pieces of the
puzzle: multilateral coordination necessary to undertake such a mammoth
financial task; and concerted economic reforms directed towards achieving
sounder macroeconomic performance and, therefore, greater borrower solvency.' 2
The so-called Washington Consensus came to rest on three "pillars": fiscal
austerity, privatization, and market liberalization.' 3 Fiscal austerity focused on the
reduction of government spending. Market liberalization included the removal of
trade barriers, investment barriers, and price controls, while privatization
centered on the sale of state-owned companies to private investors.
Much attention in the social sciences and accompanying political discourse
has been devoted to the implications of the IMF's conditionality policies, its
8. William R. Cline, Mexico's Crisis, the World's Peril, 49 FOREIGN POL'Y 107, 107 (1982) ("Loans to
Mexico accounted for 44 per cent of the nine largest U.S. banks' capital in 1981. Mexican failure to pay interest
on these loans for a year would eliminate more than one-third of their annual net profits.").
9. See James M. Boughton, From Suez to Tequila: The IMF as CrisisManager, 110 ECON. J. 273, 28586 (2000) (describing the process whereby a meeting of Mexican officials with the U.S. government in
Washington D.C. was immediately followed by a mission of IMF officials to Mexico City to complete the
initial restructuring package).
10. See id. at 286 (describing the IMF's innovation at this time in persuading banks to act in their
"collective interest in maintaining Mexico's ability to service its debts" rather than insisting on full repayment
of individual claims).
11. Id.
12. The IMF pursued these economic reforms through the authority granted to it by Article IV of its
Articles of Agreement and through the subsequent, landmark decision of 1979 interpreting Article IV to
authorize a policy of conditionality. See Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, art. IV, Dec.
27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1401, 2 U.N.T.S. 39; Decision No. 6056-(79/38), INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND,
GUIDELINES ON CONDITIONALITY (Mar. 2, 1979). Note that in 2002, the IMF repealed this 1979 decision in
conjunction with an effort to synthesize and restate its lending policies. See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND,
GUIDELINES ON CONDMONALITY 6 (Sept. 25, 2002). Grounded in legal authority, the IMF nevertheless often
chose notably informal, non-binding frameworks for agreement on economic reform: Letters of Intent (LOIs),
Memoranda of Economic and Financial Policies (MEFPs), and Technical Memoranda of Understanding
(TMUs). To begin with, formal infringement of a borrower government's sovereignty remained a delicate
matter, particularly in the early 1980s when the alternative, structuralist, and redistributive economic vision of
the New International Economic Order retained some political visibility. Moreover, it could be assumed that
whatever influence the IMF could exert would arise through its control over levers of multilateral and
commercial funding.
13. JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 53 (2003).
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models of structural adjustment, and its means of influence over governmental
reform in developing countries.'4 Fewer scholars, however, have documented the
internal political change that unfolded within many borrower countries during
this time. In Mexico, as with many developing countries, the economic shocks of
the debt crisis and related hardships created conditions for popular tolerance of
reform, and that, coupled with a transformation of the sociological profile of the
administrative and political leadership in Mexico, led to a strong internal push
towards liberalization.' 5 The Mexican government proceeded through the
administrations of Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1988), Carlos Salinas de Gortari
(1988-1994), and Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000),' 6 with all of these
Administrations following liberalization programs, albeit with varying degrees of
fidelity.
In assessing the implications of this dynamic for "global governance"
studies, it goes without saying that power-in the forms of economic coercion
and political influence-played a central role in determining the structure and
outcomes of Mexican reform efforts. The precise contours of this power,
however, remain somewhat obscure. While the international financial community
exerted clear influence over the Mexican government, power traveled through
many circuits with clear dynamics of resistance as well as coercion. 7 The fuller
intricacies of the processes and practices whereby the Washington Consensus
was adopted, resisted, implemented, and not implemented in the Mexican
context, make for an extremely important study but one whose details must
remain for another time. Suffice it to say that the broader outline of political and
economic change in this period displayed a decisive turn towards a neoclassical,
rather than statist, economic policy model and an agenda of reform through
economic liberalization.
B. Budget Consolidationand Trade Liberalization
With the conditionality of the IMF-brokered refinancing resting on deep
macroeconomic transformation,' 9 Mexico embarked on a program of economic
14. See e.g., WALDEN BELLO, DARK VICTORY: THE UNITED STATES, STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT, AND
GLOBAL POVERTY (1994); GILES MOHAN ET AL., STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT: THEORY, PRACTICE AND
IMPACTS (2000); DAVID E. SAHN ET AL., STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT RECONSIDERED (2000).
15. See Roderic A. Camp, The Political Technocrat in Mexico and the Survival of the PoliticalSystem,
20 LATIN AM. RES. REV. 97, 104 (1985); Wayne A. Cornelius, The PoliticalEconomy of Mexico under de la
Madrid: Austerity, Routinized Crisis, and Nascent Recovery, I MEX. STUD. 83, 84 (1985).
16. Followed by Vicente Fox Quesada (2000-2006) and Felipe Calder6n Hinojosa (2006-present).
17. See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTERVIEWS AND OTHER
WRITINGS 1972-1977 (Colin Gordon ed., 1980).
18. See Leslie Elliot Armijo & Philippe Faucher, "We Have a Consensus": ExplainingPoliticalSupport
for Market Reforms in Latin America, 44 LATIN AM. POL. & SOC'Y 1 (2002).
19. See supra note 12. For a more detailed explanation of the origins of conditionality, see Chantal
Thomas, Does the "Good Governance Policy" of the InternationalFinancialInstitutions Privilege Markets at
the Expense of Democracy?, 14 CONN. J. INT'L L. 553, at n. 13 (1999).
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reform that continued, at various levels of intensity, throughout the rest of the
1980s and 1990s. Under the IMF Stabilization Program of 1982, Mexico pursued
the reforms that would come to form the three pillars of the Washington
Consensus: privatization and fiscal austerity, each part of the overall goal of
"budget consolidation," and trade liberalization.
As part of its commitment to budget consolidation and inflation control, the
Mexican government significantly decreased public spending, such that public
sector deficits declined from eighteen percent to eight percent of GDP by the
following year.20 Privatization, with its accompanying dramatic reductions in
state investment in the economy,2 ' also contributed to budget consolidation.
State-owned enterprises declined from 1,100 in 1982 to less than 250 in 1992,2
with privatizations occuring through a variety and range of sectors and
companies.2 ' Through fiscal austerity and privatization, the budget moved from a
deficit of 16.9 percent in 1982 to a surplus of 0.5 percent a decade later.24
Because the primary goal was the "stabilization" of the economy, primarily
through the control of inflation, Mexico's eagerness to pursue trade liberalization
during this era arose less from an export-led growth development modelalthough this model certainly was held to be complementary at the time" -than
from a desire to control inflation by introducing competition from imports into
the domestic market.26
In terms of market liberalization, Mexico's biggest achievement was the
establishment of NAFTA in 1994. NAFTA introduced significant reductions in
investment through the elimination of restrictions in investment and in trade."
With respect to the latter, tariffs and other customs duties were to be phased out
on all cross-border trade in goods between the United States and Mexico in
successive stages, with the first category of goods becoming duty-free

20. World Bank, World Development Indicators Online Database (2006).
21. State investment as a percentage of the economy nearly halved in the ensuing years. Miguel D.
Ramirez, The Latest IMF-Sponsored Stabilization Program: Does It Represent a Long-Term Solution for
Mexico's Economy?, 38 J. INTERAMERICAN STUD. & WORLD AFF. 129, 137 (1996).
22. Eliot Kalter, The Mexican Strategy to Achieve Sustainable Economic Growth, in MEXICO: THE
STRATEGY TO ACHIEVE SUSTAINED

ECONOMIC GROWTH, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, OCCASIONAL

PAPER No. 99, at 7 (Claudio M. Loser & Eliot Kalter eds., 1999).

23. See Enrique R. Carrasco, Law, Hierarchy, and Vulnerable Groups in Latin America: Towards A
Communal Model of Development in a NeoliberalWorld, 30 STAN. J. INT'L L. 221, 254 (1994).
24. Dombusch & Werner, supra note 7, at 260 tbl.4.
25. See Jeffrey D. Sachs, Economic Transitionand the Exchange-Rate Regime, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 147,
147 (1996) (describing the basic group of initial market reforms in stabilization programs as "the liberalization
of prices, the unification of the official exchange rate and the market exchange rate, and the opening of the
economy to international trade"); see also STIGLrTZ, supra note 13.
26. See NORA LUSTIG, MEXICO: THE REMAKING OF AN ECONOMY 120 (2d ed. 1992).
27. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, art. 1102, 32 I.L.M. 605,
639 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA] (establishing national treatment); id. at art. 1106, 32 I.L.M. at 640 (liberalizing
performance requirements); id. at art. 1109, 32 I.L.M. at 641 (liberalizing restrictions on capital transfer).
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immediately2 and the final date for achieving duty-free status being fifteen years
later. 29
Even prior to NAFTA, however, the government adopted many ambitious
market-liberalizing reforms. As early as 1985, Mexico commenced negotiations
with the United States toward a bilateral trade agreement providing for the
liberalization of import barriers and export subsides.30 Finalized in 1987, this
effort coincided with Mexico's 1986 accession to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the elimination of import and export price controls it
required, 3' and the remarkable steps de la Madrid's government took in
accelerating tariff liberalization beyond the GATT timetable.32 In 1987, trade
liberalization measures were deepened further through the negotiation of a
Framework Agreement with the United States. 33 The onset of NAFTA
negotiations, initiated not by the United States but by the Mexican government
under Salinas, thus represented the culmination of concerted efforts towards trade
liberalization.34
C. Exchange-Rate Management, CapitalInflows, and Currency Instability
In addition to fiscal austerity, privatization, and "market liberalization,"
exchange rate management was always a central aspect of the stabilization
programs of the IMF.35 Indeed, notwithstanding the three pillars, it might be
argued that the overarching goal in the initial phases of the Washington
Consensus era was the stabilization of the monetary and currency environment in
borrower countries, as the name of the structural adjustment programs (the
"Stabilization Program" described in Part I.B. above) adopted by Mexico and
other client governments itself indicated. Thus, Mexico pursued a fixed exchange
rate regime throughout this era-until it was forced to abandon it.
Exchange-rate and currency stabilization, together with macroeconomic
reform, created an environment in the late 1980s and early 1990s of increasing

28. Id. at annex 302.2(1)(a), 32 I.L.M. 289, 309-10 (providing that duties on "category A" goods be
eliminated by January 1, 1994).
Id. at annex 302.2(1)(c), 32 I.L.M. at 310 (providing that duties on "category C" goods be
29.
eliminated by January 1, 2008).
30. See Understanding Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of
the United Mexican States Concerning a Framework of Principles and Procedures for Consultation Regarding
Trade and Investment Relations, Nov. 6, 1987, 27 I.L.M. 439 (1988). For a description of this negotiation
process, see the account by former Attorney-Advisor to the Office of the Chief Counsel for International
Commerce. Guy C. Smith, The United States-Mexico Framework Agreement: Implicationsfor BilateralTrade,
20 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 656 (1988-1989).

31. Manuel Pastor & Carol Wise, The Origins and Sustainability of Mexico's Free Trade Policy, 48
INT'L ORG. 459, 461 (1994).
32. Id. at 471.
33. Id. at 461.
34. ld. at 471.
35. See Sachs, supra note 25.
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investor and business confidence in forecasts for the Mexican economy."
Mexico's capital markets received their initial boost from the U.S. Treasury's
"Brady plan" for further debt restructuring, involving both the reduction and the
37
securitization of Mexico's sovereign debt commitments. Laying the basis for an
"emerging market" in securities, the Brady plan and subsequent capitalizations,
for the first time in the history of the post-debt crisis efforts, effected the
transformation from net capital outflow to net capital inflow for Mexico.38 Stock
market volume also increased dramatically, further increasing capital inflows.3 9
These capital inflows were, however, "highly liquid." 40 Even at the time, this
sudden increase in liquidity seemed ominous for the less "optimistic" observers,
given the simultaneously large trade deficit that was being financed by borrowing
abroad.4' Unfortunately, the pessimists were correct: the groundwork was being
laid for a major currency crisis.
The seeds of the currency crisis lay in the fundamental contradiction between
rateaind
and its" trade
Mexico's fixed
low
elatve
ndexchange
rics re
42 deficit. Domestic growth remained
low and relative prices remained high. The focus on disinflation, and the
required political investment in the pegged exchange rate, most likely blinded the
Mexican government and its advisors from perceiving the need for a correction in
currency value until it was too late. Increasingly negative investor speculation
and domestic political instability forced a currency devaluation in December of
1994 that caused the peso to drop in value by fifty percent in 1995. 43
36. BUSINESS AMERICA, a publication of the U.S. government targeted towards and reporting on the
U.S. business and export community, published a series of articles during this time period proclaiming
"increased business confidence." See Paul Dacher, Mexico's Economic Growth is Achieved Through Reform,
Privatization,Bus. AM., Oct. 8, 1990, at 11; Paul Dacher, Economic Reform Ushers Mexico into a Periodof
Optimism andIncreasedBusiness Confidence, Bus. AM., Dec. 4, 1989, at 6.
37. See generally Haluk Unal, Asih Demirg Qu-Kunt, & Kwok-Wai Leung, The Brady Plan, the 1989
Mexican Debt Reduction Agreement, and Bank Stock Returns in the United States and Japan, Policy Research
Working Paper Series 1012 (World Bank 1999), available at http://ideas.repec.org/p/wbk/wbrwps/1012.html
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review); William Branigin, Mexico, IMF Reach Accord on $3.63 Billion Loan
Plan; Pact Called 1st Support of Debt-Cut Demands, WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 1989, at Fl; Walter S. Mossberg &
Peter Truell, Bush Hopesfor Early Debt-CurbPlansAs World Bank, IMF Endorse Strategy, WALL ST. J., Apr.
5, 1989, § Econ.
38. Dombusch & Werner, supra note 7, at 258 (describing how net capital transfer finally began to turn
positive for Mexico following the Brady plan, with inflows going from negative levels in 1988 to positive
inflows of $26.5 billion by 1992 and $22 billion in the first three quarters of 1993).
39. See id. (recording stock market increase of 125 percent in 1991, about twenty-five percent in 1992,
and almost fifty percent in 1993).
40. Id. at 259.
41. See id.
42. For an explanation of the dynamics of a balance of payments crisis, see Chantal Thomas, Balanceof-Payments Crises in the Developing World: Balancing Trade, Finance and Development in the New
Economic Order, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1249 (2000).
43. Ramirez, supra note 21, at 129.
What made this recent debicle so shocking and dismaying to the average Mexican was that, only
one short year before, news headlines had been touting Mexico's economic boom and confidently
predicting that, with passage of the recently concluded North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), the country was well on its way to joining the ranks of economies in the First World.
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D. Full Circle: FurtherAusterity and Trade Liberalization
In response, the Mexican government had to adopt another IMF Stabilization
Program in 1995. The features of this stabilization program repeated many of the
tenets of its predecessor, introducing the following measures: an immediate
across-the-board cut in government spending of almost ten percent; immediate
increases of thirty-five percent in petroleum prices and twenty percent in
electricity prices; increases in the value-added tax; and a dramatic decrease in the
money supply, leading to short-term interest rates of more than forty percent." At
the same time, trade liberalization, now accelerated by NAFTA, continued to
transform the Mexican economy. With liberalizations under NAFTA, Mexico's
current account underwent rapid changes. In the five years after NAFTA was
implemented, Mexico's trade surplus fell from ten percent of GDP to two
percent.45

II. LABOR RELATIONS, "MARKET LIBERALIZATION"
AND "INCOMES POLICY"
"Market liberalization," in the Mexican context, proved to be a peculiar
concept. While liberalization was evident in the rapid removal of barriers to
cross-border trade, when it came to the domestic market, the government adopted
corporatist measures that reduced the ability of labor unions to resist the larger
goal of controlling inflation. Central to the disinflation strategy was the
government's "incomes" policy, which called for the implementation of wage
controls. Incomes policy was practiced through pactos, whose parties were
"government-friendly unions," "the business community," and "the
government." The first pacto, the Economic Solidarity Pact (PSE), was created
in December 1987, later renamed the Pact for Stability and Economic Growth in
1988, and periodically renewed thereafter.
These pacts may have partially exemplified some sort of enlightened selfinterest on the part of labor unions, or, more prosaically, their acceptance of the
growing ideological consensus on free trade policy. 48 The pacts were undoubtedly
made possible by the "institutional clout" of the reigning political party, the
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). Corporatism in Mexico featured not only
an autocratic and presidentialist government but a labor movement strongly allied

Id.
44. Id. at 140.
45. World Bank, supra note 20.
46. Dornbusch & Werner, supra note 7, at 271.
47. See Daniel F. Oks, Stabilizationand Growth Recovery in Mexico: Lessons and Dilemmas 4-7 (1992)
(World Bank Policy Research Working Papers Series 833).
48. Pastor & Wise, supra note 31, at 469 (noting the unprecedented ideological free trade consensus).
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with its two partners in the tripartite corporatist framework, government and
business.
The labor context in Mexico is a complex one. The Mexican Constitution
recognizes the right of association and the right to strike," as well as a variety of
other protections pertaining to maximum hours and minimum pay. 0 In addition
to these substantive protections, labor unionism occupies an institutionally
privileged position through the Labor Congress (Congreso del Trabajo or CT)
and its largest member, the Confederation of Mexican Workers (La
Confederaci6n de Trabajadores de M6xico or CTM). The most important
example of the "official" union, the CTM, was established in 1936 by and as a
part of the ruling party during the administration of Lizaro Cdrdenas, who in turn
supported the CTM's pursuit and achievement of "pro[-]labor wage policies."'"
Some studies have suggested that Mexican labor features a level of union
democracy greater than that in the United States or the United Kingdom. 2
Certainly, at the height of the corporatist labor regime, the official unions
effectively pressed the interests of their members. If access came at the expense
of organizational pluralism,53 that seemed an acceptable trade-off through the
1970s.-4 At the same time, critics have long asserted that, during this period, the
labor movement in Mexico became a "passive instrument[] of the state."55 This

49. Constituci6n Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [Constitution], Artfculo 123 (XVI) ("Tanto
los obreros como los empresarios tendrin derecho para coaligarse en defensa de sus respectivos intereses,
formando sindicatos, asociaciones profesionales, etc."); Id., as amended Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [D.O.],
6 de Octubre de 1986, Articulo 123 (XVII) ("Las leyes reconocerin como un derecho de los obreros y de los
patronos, las huelgas y los paros.").
50. Id. at Artfculo 123 (I), as amended Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [D.O.], 6 de Octubre de 1986
("La duraci6n de la jornada mdxima serd de ocho horas."); Id. at Artfculo 123 (H1),as amended Diario Oficial de
la Federaci6n [D.O.], 31 de Diciembre de 1974 ("La jornada mdxima de trabajo noctumo serd de 7 horas."); id.
at Artfculo 123 (VI), as amended Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [D.O.], 23 de Diciembre de 1986 ("Los
salarios nrinimos se fijardn por una comisi6n nacional integrada por representantes de los trabajadores, de los
patrones y del gobierno.").
51. Kevin J. Middlebrook, State Structures and the Politics of Union Registrationin Postrevolutionary
Mexico, 23 COMP. POL. 459, 461 (1991).
52. Stephen F. Befort & Virginia E. Cornett, Beyond the Rhetoric of the NAFTA Treaty Debate: A
ComparativeAnalysis of Labor and Employment Law in Mexico and the United States, 17 COMP. LAB. L. J.
269, 305-06 (1996).
53. Irma Campuzano Montoya, El Impacto de la Crisis en la CTM, 52 REVISTA MEXICANA DE
SOCIOLOGIA 161, 161-62 (1990) ("Para mantener su fuerza, la CTM ha estorbado el registro de nuevas
agrupaciones sindicales y ha bloqueado el desarollo de la democracia sindical .... ").
54. Maria Lorena Cook, Mexican State-LaborRelations and the PoliticalImplications of Free Trade, 22
LATIN AM. PERSP. 77, 78-79 (1995) (noting that "[t]he fact that official labor organizations enjoyed a privileged
status did not mean that tensions between the government and labor were absent" and explaining that unions
were able to "influence the direction of national development policy" through their ability to deliver votes
through the mass organizations that they headed). Cook also notes that the 1970s were "a period of relative
innovation and activism" in union politics, with several independent and "breakaway" unions established in this
time frame. Id. at 80.
55. IAN ROXBOROUGH, UNIONS AND POLrTICs IN MEXICO 5 (1984).
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passivity arose primarily out of the "official" union leadership's reliance on state
patronage and the manipulation of "closed shop" agreements.56
Mexican corporatism manifested itself in state control of unions from the
point of their establishment, determining their range of action and collective
bargaining agreements. In particular, this "centralized, unresponsive.., system
of internal union governance" was maintained through minimal and superficial
labor democracy. The smaller and more independent National Union of
Workers (Uni6n Nacional de Trabajadores, or UNT) has decried this "silence and
immobility through the corporatism exercised by the state."59 The practical
hurdles faced by independent union organizers arise from the extensive control
exerted by both the official unions and the state over the union certification and
election processes. Another criticized practice is that of newly formed companies
establishing the terms of collective employment, in the contrato de protecci6n,
prior to the actual hiring of workers. The collective bargaining agreement thus
operates like an adhesion contract.
In any case, through the 1980s, the corporatist situation forced unions to
accede to reforms. In this new era, however, the old trade-off of independence for
access did not pan out as well. The reforms themselves produced destabilizations
from which the official unions, whether they had access or not, were ill-prepared
to protect workers. 60 Moreover, the climate of "neoliberalism" surrounding these
reforms further undermined the legitimacy of the official unions' position.61
Whether or not the pactos resulted from meaningful consent on the part of
labor unions to wage reforms, they ultimately failed to jumpstart internal
competitiveness in the Mexican economy. Relatively low wages did not succeed
in sufficiently stimulating domestic investment to generate significant new
employment. GDP growth remained negligible through the 1980s and mid1990s, and, although the economy began to grow after 1995, the results have
remained "disappointing. 63
56.

Befort & Cornett, supra note 52, at 304.

Uni6n Nacional de Trabajadores, La UNT rechaza la contrareforma laboral,in REFORMA LABORAL
219 (Nestor & Carlos de Buen eds., 2006) [hereinafter Uni6n Nacional de Trabajadores]
,QUE
NECESITAMOS?
4
(criticizing "el control estatal de los sindicatos desde su registro, ladeterminaci6n de su radio de acci6n y la
firma y latitularidad de los contratos colectivos").
57.

Befort & Cornett, supra note 52, at 304.
59. "Silencio [e]... inmovilismo por el corporativimo ejercido por el Estado." Uni6n Nacional de
Trabajadores, supra note 57, 221 (criticizing "el control estatal de los sindicatos desde su registro, la
58.

determinaci6n de su radio de acci6n y lafirma y latitularidad de los contratos colectivos").
60. See Cook, supra note 54, at 79 (noting that the official unions' "inability to halt the precipitous
decline in workers' living standards further eroded workers' support for their union leaders").
61. See id.
62. See Dornbusch & Werner, supra note 7, at 281-82. Dornsbusch & Werner have argued that the
Mexican government at this time overemphasized inflation control through its exchange rate management and
incomes policies, and that it should have instead allowed for some inflation, up to 15-18 percent, as the price of
the private sector gaining competitiveness. id. at 282. (citing RUDIGER DORNBUSCH, STABILIZATION, DEBT AND
REFORM: POLICY ANALYSIS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1993)).

63.

Nora Lustig, Life is not Easy: Mexico's Quest for Stability and Growth, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 85, 86

2010 / Globalizationand the Border
Although the traditional closeness of the "official" unions with the
government traditionally did give labor some independent influence on
government policy and did not crowd out the possibility of debate, the era of
economic reform and liberalization appears to have weakened the labor
movement further. This weakness stemmed in part from labor unions' inability to
soften some of the hardest-hitting blows of the structural adjustment program,
including the reduction of consumer subsidies and the associated effect of peso
devaluations. 6' The disillusionment of workers with the labor unions softened
their political influence still further, as evidenced by the failure of labor unions to
deliver votes in the election won by Salinas.65 The relative weakness of
traditional labor unions, particularly in the wake of the other socioeconomic
changes underway, culminated not only in the negotiation and renewal of the
pactos but also in a government crackdown on corruption within traditional
labor. 6'
The anticorruption investigations might have paved the way for renewed
vitality and democracy in the labor movement, particularly after the long-ruling
PRI fell to the election of Vicente Fox in 2000.67 The surrounding forces of
globalization at work in the Mexican economy, however, have made this
difficult. The Salinas era ended with the establishment of NAFTA. Although
there was some diversity of views within the Mexican labor movement, the
official unions supported the negotiation of NAFTA, on the theory that the
increased trade and investment it would bring to Mexico would increase and
improve jobs for Mexican workers. (The same argument was made to trade
unions in the United States and Canada regarding employment in their respective
(2001). From 1982 to 2005, Mexico's GDP showed a negative rate of growth two-thirds of the time, i.e. sixteen
out of twenty-four years. World Bank, World Development Indicators Online Database (2006).
64. Montoya, supranote 53, at 165.
Ante la nueva situaci6n, las centrales conocidas como oficiales ... han apoyado proyectos de
desarrollo econ6mico que han redundado en el sacrificio de la clase trabajadora .... Antes, los
trabajadores... se mantenfan inmovilizados con la esperanza de una mejorla individual... Ahora, la
inflaci6n y el desempleo han deteriorado las condiciones de vida de los obreros y destruido las
esperanzas.
Id.
65. Maria Lorena Cook, Mexican State-Labor Relations and the PoliticalImplications of Free Trade, 22
LATIN AM. PERSP. 77, 80 (1995).
66. See id. at 81.
67. Such has been the hopeful pronouncement of an ever-shifting coalition of progressive Mexican
legislators and independent union members. See, e.g., Grupo Parlamentario del Partido de la Revoluci6n
DemocrAtica, CAmara de Diputados del Congreso de la Uni6n, LVIII Legislatura, Una reforma democrdtica
para el Mundo del Trabajo: Propuesta Laboral, PRD-UNT, 58, 71 (2003), available at http://www.
cnd.org.mx/Memorias/ponencias/407.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) ("el fin de la hegemonfa del
PRI, la alternancia en el gobiemo federal y el nuevo reparto de poder que refleja con mayor fidelidad la
pluralidad de la sociedad mexicana, generan una atm6sfera propicia para la transformaci6n democr~tica de
nuestro pafs.").
68. For a description of the debates within Mexican labor unions and an account of the factors leading to
their ultimate endorsement of NAFTA, see Katrina Burgess, Mexican Labor at a Crossroads,in MEXICO'S
POLmCS AND SOCIETY IN TRANSMON 73, 90 (Joseph S. Tulchin & Andrew D. Selee eds., 2003).
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economies. 69 The latter unions rejected this argument, largely for the reasons that
underscored the Mexican official unions' endorsement of NAFTA as a driver of
Mexican employment.7 )
The relative decline of both the influence of organized labor and the level of
formal labor protections can be traced to several factors, each of which will be
briefly explained here: the ongoing political debate on the possibility of
"flexibilization" 71 of labor regulations; the informalization of employment; and
the related increase in employment in maquiladoras. First, an ongoing debate
over the necessity of flexibilization of labor regulations likely has undercut the
bargaining power of official unions.72 In any case, official unions became even
less assertive than in prior eras and were increasingly associated with a posture of
complicity towards the non-enforcement of basic labor protections embodied in
the Mexican Constitution and the 1970 labor regulation. Second, any effect of the
flexibilization reforms in undermining the position of official unions was
underscored by their helplessness to protect from the impact of macroeconomic
destabilizations.
Third, informalization of employment contributed to the relative softness in
the bargaining position of organized labor. Rapid urbanization resulting from
economic dislocations created an equally rapid expansion in the urban labor force
that was most easily absorbed into informal-sector employment. In addition, the
shift to the maquiladora sector created a dampening effect on labor organization.
This was partly due to the concomitant rise of subcontractor suppliers to
maquiladoras and partly because the maquiladoras themselves appear to have
resisted labor organization. Some feminist and human rights scholars have
speculated that the relatively low levels of labor organization in the maquiladora
sector may stem from the fact that the majority of its workers are women, who
are subject to a variety of socioeconomic and cultural factors that appear to
73
inhibit union organizing.

69. See GARY C. HUFBAUER & JEFFREY J. SCHoT-r, NAFTA REVISITED: ACHIEVEMENTS
CHALLENGES 79 (2005).

AND

70. See ARTURO ZARATE-RUIz, A RHETORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE NAFrA DEBATE 23-25 (2000).
71. Katherine V.W. Stone, Flexibilization, Globalization, and Privatization: Three Challenges to
Labour Rights in Our Time, 44 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 77, 79 (2006) (defining flexibilization as "changing work
practices by which firms no longer use internal labour markets or implicitly promise employees lifetime job
security, but rather seek flexible employment relations that permit them to increase or diminish their workforce,
and reassign and redeploy employees with ease.").
72. Enrique de laGarza Toledo, NAFTA, Manufactura y Trabajo en Mexico, Monograph Presented to
General Assembly of the Latin American Council of Social Sciences (CLASCO) in Guadalajara, Mex. 19, 21
(Nov. 21-24, 2001), available at http://docencia.izt.uam.mx/egt/congresos/nafmantrab.pdf (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) ("[D]esde 1988 se inici6 un debate que no termina adn acerca de la necesidad de
flexibilizar laley laboral, y que se ha intensificado despurs de laentrada en vigor del NAFTA.").
73. See., e.g., Laura Ho, Catherine Powell & Leti Volpp, (Dis)Assembling Rights of Women Workers
Along the Global Assembly Line: Human Rights and the Garment Industry, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 383
(1996); see also Maria A. Plumtree, Maquiladoras and Women Workers: The Marginalizationof Women in
Mexico as a Means to Economic Development, 6 Sw. J. L. & TRADE AM. 177 (1999); Grace C. Spencer, Her
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In this sense, NAFTA may have contributed indirectly to the relative
weakness in labor organization by unleashing social dynamics that constrained
the ability of workers to organize. In terms of its facial requirements, NAFTA
appears to have very little effect either way. The NAFTA "side agreement on
labor," the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC), 74 while
calling on governments to "promote" a wide range of labor principles,75
establishes a process for examining complaints only with respect to a signatory's
non-enforcement of its own laws.76 Effectively, the NAALC does not establish

positive obligations but rather addresses signatories' existing labor laws.
Even the obligation to enforce existing labor laws, together with the
longstanding and ever-increasing tolerance by the official unions of noncompliant labor practices, harbored the potential to be transformative in the
Mexican context. The ability of NAALC to gain momentum in this respect was
somewhat stymied as support declined with the transition from the Clinton to
Bush Administrations, but some NAALC experts have remained optimistic about
its potential for assisting the formation of transnational networks in labor and
human rights movements.77
From the beginning, it has been clear that the primary value of NAALC lay
in its potential for monitoring and building opportunities for exchange and
dialogue among labor unions. The key mechanism was an investigation
conducted by a NAALC National Administrative Office (NAO) at its own
initiative or at the petition of a labor union in a signatory state other than the one
in which the alleged violation occurred." Ministerial Consultations occupied the
next level of review. 79 Finally, if such consultations failed, an Evaluation
Committee of Experts (ECE) could examine the matter and issue a report.80
For a core of labor issues, defined by the NAALC as "occupational safety
and health, child labor or minimum wage technical labor standards," the ECE
may recommend further action upon finding a "persistent pattern of failure."'"
From there, if the matter cannot be resolved through consultations, a panel may
82
be convened and sanctions recommended .

Body Is a Battlefield: The Applicability of the Alien Tort Statute to CorporateHuman Rights Abuses in Juarez,
Mexico, 40 GONZ. L. REv. 503 (2004-2005).
74. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1499
(entered into force Jan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter NAALC].
75. See id. at arts. 1-2, 32 I.L.M. 1499, 1503.
76. See id. at art. 4.
77. See., e.g., Lance Compa, A Glass Half Full: The NAFTA Labor Agreement and Cross-BorderLabor
Action, in CONCEPTS AND STRATEGIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS (2002).

78. See NAALC, supra note 74, at art. 21.
79. See id. at art. 22.
80. See id. at arts. 23-25.
81.

Id. at art. 27.

82.

See id. at arts. 28-41.
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Notwithstanding the relative lack of emphasis on formal enforcement power,
one might have hoped that labor unions would use the NAALC's information
gathering capabilities more than they actually have. Regarding labor practices in
Mexico, the first year of the NAALC saw a promising start, with petitions by
several U.S. unions (among them the AFL-CIO and the United Electrical, Radio
and Machine Workers of America) to the U.S. NAO to investigate labor practices
in the Mexican subsidiaries of Honeywell, General Electric, and Sony
corporations."
The last of these investigations resulted in the NAO's recommendation of
Ministerial Consultations. The Ministerial Consultations themselves produced a
series of information-gathering activities: three public seminars on union
registration and certification; the establishment by the Mexican Secretariat of
Labor and Social Welfare of a task force to study labor law and practice related
to the registration of unions; and a meeting between the Mexican Secretariat and
the company's management and labor representatives.4
Tellingly, most of the NAO reports center precisely around the ability of
workers to organize independent unions. The petitions mentioned above, filed
against the subsidiaries of Honeywell, General Electric, and Sony, all focused on
the right to freedom of association and the right to organize. The Honeywell and
General Electric cases alleged that managers had fired workers for attempting to
join independent factory unions, as well as questionable labor practices regarding
the influence of the state in the national labor Arbitration and Conciliation
Boards. 85 The Sony case also involved attempts by workers to form an
independent union. The petitioners alleged, and the NAO found, that
management had committed several harmful practices, including threatening
organizers with dismissal and demotion and using police to violently suppress
83. See U.S. NAT'L ADMIN. OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, NAO: NAALC SUBMISSION 940001 AND
940002 (1994), http://www.dol.gov/ilab/media/reports/nao/940001.htm (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) (describing a submission (940001) by the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT) alleging that
Honeywell fired workers in Mexico who expressed an interest in joining an independent union and a submission
(No. 940002) by United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers (UE) alleging that a General Electric
subsidiary in Mexico interfered with workers' attempts to organize an independent union); U.S. NAT'L ADMIN.
OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, PUBLIC REPORT OF REVIEW OF NAO SUBMISSION No. 940003 (1994),
http://www.dol.gov/ilab/media/reports/nao/PUBREP940003.htm (on file with the McGeorge Law Review)
(describing a submission by human rights and workers' rights organizations filed against Sony alleging that
Sony's operations in Mexico repeatedly interfered with an internal union dispute and a union delegate election);
U.S. Dep't of Labor, Status of Submissions Under the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation
(NAALC), http:llwww.dol.govlilablprogramslnaolstatus.htm#iia3 (last visited Sept. 24, 2007) (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (explaining that UE filed U.S. NAO Submission 940004 against a General Electric
subsidiary in Mexico and later withdrew the submission before the review was complete).
84. See U.S. Nat'l Admin. Office, U.S. Dep't of Labor, The Ministerial Consultations Agreement,
Submission 94003, availableat http://www.dol.gov/ilab/medialreports/nao/minagreemt940003.htm (last visited
Oct. 4, 2010) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
85. Nicole L. Grimm, The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation and Its Effects on Women
Working in the Maquiladoras, 48 AM. U.L. REV. 179, 212-13 (1998). In these cases the NAO did not
recommend further action because workers had accepted severance pay packages, which in the view of the
NAO Report precluded further action under NAALC. Id.
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employee demonstrations. 6 In this case, the NAO recommended consultations
and issued a follow-up report pursuant to then-U.S. Secretary of Labor's
directive "to continue to observe union registration activities. 's
In the ensuing years, a total of thirty-four submissions have been filed,
twenty-one were filed with the U.S. NAO (nineteen involving allegations against
Mexico and two against Canada); eight with the Mexican NAO (all against the
United States); and five in Canada (three against Mexico and two against the
United States). 8 Ministerial Consultations resulted from fewer than half of those
twelve reports. The next stage of review, formation of an Evaluative Committee
of Experts, never occurred. The possible reasons for the relative lack of use of the
NAALC mechanism-perhaps including a troubled history between U.S. and
Mexican unions and the perceived unlikeliness of momentum since the process
was unlikely to escalate-would be the basis for a very interesting research
project. This is beyond the scope of the current Article, however. Whatever the
reasons, the NAALC mechanism is relatively disused.
III. ECONOMIC DESTABILIZATION AND LABOR MIGRATION
While public sector employment was declining due to fiscal austerity
measures, the private sector failed to grow enough to absorb the difference. The
sluggishness of domestic private sector growth stemmed at least in part from two
other disinflation strategies adopted alongside "incomes policy." First, an
overvalued currency and associated highs in relative prices, together with high
interest rates, contributed to the high real cost of credit, impeding the ability of
domestic firms to expand. 9 Second, the rapid introduction of imports effectuated
a shift of consumer spending from domestic to imported items, particularly since
the overvalued currency meant that the prices of Mexican goods were at all-time
highs relative to imported and international goods. 9° Although exports grew
throughout this period they were dwarfed by imports.
The result of these trends was that formal employment declined,
accompanied by increases in the informal sector and also in labor migration. The
picture that emerges from this period is the combination of relative compliance of
official labor unions with liberalizing reforms, declines in formal employment,
and increases in labor migration.

86. Id.
at 214.
87. Id.
88. See United States Department of Labor, Status of Submissions under the NAALC (Mar. 2010)
http://www.dol.gov/ilab/programs/nao/status.htm#iial5 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (providing a
complete list of submissions).
89. See supra Part I.B. & I.C.
90. See id.; see also Jeffrey Sachs et al., The Collapse of the Mexican Peso: What Have We Learned?,
11 ECON. POL'Y 13 (1996).
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Migrant labor streams flowed into the growing maquiladora industry.
Maquiladora employment quadrupled from approximately 127,000 to
approximately 541,000.9' Dislocations caused by instability in international

capital flows and exchange rate policy appear to have been directly linked to
surges in maquiladoras, with sharp increases in maquiladora operations tracking
peso devaluations.92
Beyond the maquiladoras, migrant labor also flowed into the United States.
Recorded immigration into the United States has reached an all-time high: 38.4
million in 2005, with the United States share at 20.2 percent of total worldwide
immigration. 93 Mexican immigration accounts for fully one-quarter of
immigration into the United States.94 Mexico accounts for approximately one
third of the "foreign-born population" in the United States. 95 The Department of
Homeland Security recently estimated there are six million unauthorized
migrants from Mexico,96 and other estimates including all Latin American
migrants place the number at twelve million. 97

This relationship between trade and immigration belies the standard
"Hecksher-Ohlin Theory of Factor Complementarity," which holds that trade and
immigration are substitutes for each other. 98 Instead, in this situation, trade and
immigration actually served as complements to each other. 99
Under traditional Heckscher-Ohlin theory, which views trade and migration
as substitutes, the following would be true: if a labor-rich nation and a capital91.

Susan Fleck & Constance Sorrentino, Employment and Unemployment in Mexico's Labor Force,

MONTHLY LAB. REV., Nov. 1994, at 3, 17 tbl.4, available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/1994/1 1/art1full.pdf.
92. See Philip Martin, Mexico-U.S. Migration, in NAFTA REVISITED: ACHIEVEMENTS AND

441, 454 (Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Jeffrey J. Schott eds., 2005) ("The number of maquiladoras
and their employment increased sharply after several peso devaluations and reached a peak of 1.3 million in
2000.
93. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on International Migration and
Development, 31 tbl.3, delivered to the GeneralAssembly, U.N. Doc. A/60/871 (May 18, 2006).
94. INT'L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, WORLD MIGRATION 2005: COSTS AND BENEFITS OF INTERNATIONAL
MIGRATION 393-94 (2005).
95. Steven A. Camarota & Nora McArdle, Where Immigrants Live: An Examination of State Residency
of the Foreign Born by Country of Origin in 1990 and 2000, BACKGROUNDER, Sept. 2003, at 1,
http://www.cis.org/articles/2003/back1203.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
96. MICHAEL HOEFER, NANCY RYTINA & CHRISTOPHER CAMPBELL, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
CHALLENGES

ESTIMATES OF THE UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES: JANUARY

2005, at 1 (2006), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ILL PE-2005.pdf (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
97. See, e.g., Victor Davis Hanson, Mexifornia, Five Years Later, CITY JOURNAL, Winter 2007,
http://www.city-joumal.org/html/17-1.mexiformia.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
98. Robert A. Mundell, International Trade and FactorMobility, 47 AM. ECON. REV. 321 (1957); see
also Maurice Schiff, Substitution in Markusen's Classic Trade and Factor Movement Complementarily Models
1 n.1 (Aug. 1, 2006) (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3974) available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=923281 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (observing the uses of the theory in
debates around NAFTA; "[a]s the then President of Mexico Salinas said during the NAFTA negotiations: "We
want to export goods, not people.").
99. James R. Markusen, Factor Movements and Commodity Trade as Complements, 14 J. INT'L ECON.
341 (1983).
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rich nation open their borders to each other, the labor-rich nation will export
labor-intensive goods to the capital-rich country. As the capital-rich country
imports labor-intensive goods from the labor-rich country, trade liberalization
will shift additional production of labor-intensive goods to the labor-rich country
(and capital-intensive goods to the capital-rich country). These production shifts,
in turn, create upward pressure on wages in the labor-rich country, discouraging
emigration.
In contrast with this standard trade story, however, when technology differs
between countries, trade and migration can be complements, not substitutes. The
cheaper workers from the labor-rich country may migrate to the capital-rich
country to increase productivity even further, and exports from the capital-rich
country will displace workers in the labor-rich country.
This alternative comes close to a thesis put forward by the sociologist Saskia
Sassen in a book entitled The Mobility of Labor and Capital: A Study in
International Investment and Labor Flow.Im Sassen's thesis was simple:
migration flows track investment flows.01 Where Northern capital-from the
United States and Europe primarily-invests in Southern countries, this flow sets
up a chain reaction that leads to Southern migration to Northern countries.
When a U.S. business invests in Mexico, old labor markets are displaced and
new labor markets are created, and simultaneously new transnational networks in
communication and transportation are forged, creating a hydraulic that draws
migrant workers into the stream of the transnational labor market. Supplementing
Sassen's thesis, one could conclude that it is not just the flow of investment-or
the flow of trade-but also the adjustments that a country must make to prepare
itself for this shift to a liberalized policy regime.
Alternatively, illegal migrants may follow a pattern of internal-then-external
migration: pursuing new work in domestic border-area export processing zones,
from which cross-border migration-increasingly facilitated by humansmuggling operations-is a short step.'0 2 This internal-then-external migration,
strikingly, often reverses but otherwise mirrors transnational capital flows.' °3
Movement across these markets occurs more easily against a background of
lowered transaction costs. These efficiencies of the global economy arise both
from technological gains in transportation and communication and from reduced
tariff barriers arising out of trade liberalization agreements. Increased legal trade

100.
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101. Seeid. at 16-21.
102. Id. at 18.
103. Id; see also Michael W. Collier, Colombian Migration to South Florida: A Most Unwelcome
Reception 5 (Fla. Int'l Univ., Latin Am. and Caribbean Ctr., Working Paper No. 9, 2004),
http://digitalcommons. fiu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=laccwps (citing SASSEN, supra note
79) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) ("[P]ersons who migrate due to dislocation will follow similar
paths to those of international capital flows, including to global cities that become the hubs for international
financial matters.").
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flows across borders leads to increased illegal trade flows by creating
opportunities to use otherwise legal commercial carriers for smuggling. In
addition, an increased volume of cross-border traffic translates into decreased
effectiveness of border inspection.1°4
Philip Martin has written on how this twist occurred in the context of
NAFTA:
Studies on NAFTA's prospective impact agreed that the bulk of the
additional jobs due to NAFTA would be created in Mexico. One hopedfor side effect of NAFTA was a reduction in unauthorized migration.
This did not happen. Instead, the number of unauthorized Mexicans
living in the United States rose from an estimated 2.5 million in 1995 to
4.5 million in 2000, representing an annual increase of 400,000 a year.'05
IV. BACKGROUND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS, DISLOCATION, AND
LOCAL MAIZE PRODUCTION

In the general atmosphere of economic liberalization described above,
Mexico undertook a variety of internal reforms to liberalize the economy that
affected corn production. For example, in 1992, an amendment to the Mexican
Constitution was adopted to allow alienation of rural property (ejidos).' ° Price
supports for corn production were removed contemporaneously. ' Reductions in
public spending, including government-financed farmer credit, were also
important reforms.08
Historically, corn in Mexico has been highly protected: a guaranteed price of
corn twice the world price has served as the social safety net in rural areas.
Mexico had about three million corn farmers in the mid-1990s, but during the

104. See Kal Raustiala, Law, liberalization& InternationalNarcotics Trafficking, 32 N.Y.U. J. INTL L.
& POL. 89, 117-121 (1999); see also Migration Policy Institute, The US-Mexico Border,June 1, 2006, available
at http://www.migrationinformation.orgUSfocus/print.cfm?ID=407 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review)
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same period, the 75,000 corn farmers in Iowa produced twice as much corn as
Mexico, at half the price.
Even in the context of trade liberalization and the negotiation of NAFTA, the
Mexican government recognized the "delicate" political nature of import
competition with domestic corn production. It initially negotiated the placement
of corn in the most protected category under NAFTA's trade liberalization
framework, providing for a fifteen year phase-out of tariffs.'" After NAFTA was
adopted, however, the Mexican government refrained from levying the
negotiated tariffs, so that corn products from the United States encountered no
barriers to import after the first thirty months. Over the next half-decade, U.S.
corn imports increased in market share from 8.9 percent to 21.3 percent. "0 At the
same time, domestic corn producer prices fell by as much as forty-seven
percent. 1 1
The drop in producer prices created an incentive to shift away from corn
production. Although this had been one of the intended effects of liberalization,
the rapidity with which tariffs were removed led to an equally sudden impact on
domestic farmers and farm workers. The share of agriculture in total employment
1999.,12
decreased from thirty-six percent in 1980 to twenty-two percent in
Unfortunately, the import surge did not succeed in keeping the consumer prices
down. In the corn sector specifically, a coincident consolidation of the domestic
tortilla industry meant instead that the prices of this basic staple increased in the
same time period. "' When the peso devalued for reasons explained in Part I
above, the increased relative cost imports also contributed to increases in the cost
of living and decline in the real wage." 4 These changes appeared to affect the
Mexican countryside particularly. Rural poverty increased, with eighty percent of
the rural population living in poverty."' As rural poverty increased, incentives to
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Discussion Paper No. 4, June 2004), http://ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/DP04NadalWiseJuly04.pdf (on file with
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V. CONCLUSION: A SUMMARY OF GENERAL
AND SPECIFIC DYNAMICS OF "GLOBALIZATION" AFFECTING IMMIGRATION
ACROSS THE MEXICO-U.S. BORDER

In sum, Mexico made several changes to its domestic legal and
administrative framework that were not captured formally in NAFTA but were a
central part of its structural economic reform, including changing its
constitutional law to allow for the alienation of rural property; decreasing public
spending causing a shrinkage not only of the public sector but also of the formal
economy, leading to a rise in both the informal economy and the incidence of
poverty; changing monetary policy, leading to high interest rates that discouraged
local firms from investing, contributing to the stagnation of the local economy;
and devaluing the currency, leading to a greater desire for hard currency, greater
increasing the attractiveness of migration and the possibility of remittances of
hard currency. When coupled with the accelerated liberalization of corn imports
into the United States, the result was a collapse in corn imports, a crowding-out
of small producers, and a stream of economic migration.
The case study of corn production against the broader context of national and
international macroeconomic policy reform provides an excellent opportunity to
explore the connections between trade and labor that remain understudied in the
literature but that hold demonstrated and important implications for policy and
the political economy of liberalizing states.
The foregoing has demonstrated that increased labour migration from
Mexico to the United States between 1980 and 2000, stemmed in large part from
macroeconomic policy reforms, implemented at the domestic and international
levels that we now associate with economic "globalization." These reforms were
ushered in by the era of "deep economic integration" - the period beginning in
the early 1980s in which domestic economic crises in many developing countries,
including Mexico, set the stage for market liberalization supported by the advice
and counsel of the Bretton Woods institutions.
For Mexico, the adoption of the NAFTA played a central role in effecting
market liberalization and setting the stage for labour migration. Far from being
the sole factor, however, the NAFTA interacted with a host of other important
reforms in Mexico's investment, fiscal, and exchange rate regimes. And while
conventional economic theory might have predicted that market liberalization
would substitute migration, events as they actually unfolded proved migration
and liberalization to be complements rather than substitutes.
116. See generally Fernando Lozano, Bryan Roberts & Frank Bean, The Interconnectednessof Internal
and InternationalMigration: The Case of the United States and Mexico (Texas Population Research Center
Papers, Num. 96-97-02, 1997).
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This dynamic has been demonstrated in three parts. First, this Article offered
a detailed account of macroeconomic policy reform in Mexico between 1980 and
2000, beginning with a discussion of the Washington Consensus as it related to
economic governance in Mexico, and addressing the effect of that relationship on
fiscal austerity, trade liberalization, and currency flows.
Second, this Article highlighted the role of labour relations, and organized
labour in particular, during this era. In general, liberalizing economic reforms
both resulted from, and further exacerbated, the weakening of labour as a
political force in Mexico. That trend appeared not to be affected by formal and
informal channels of transnational labour organizing, despite their potential to
offset or reverse it.
Finally, the Article delineated the causal chain of events from economic
liberalization to economic dislocation to labour migration. In brief, economic
liberalization displaced workers in Mexico and caused flows of surplus labour
into Mexican cities, maquiladoras, and ultimately the United States.
By demonstrating the link between migration and economic liberalization
across the Mexico-U.S. border, this Article emphasizes the importance of
understanding the connections between trade and labor in both scholarship and
practice, and as such seeks to support emerging, interdisciplinary labor law and
policy discourse. Too often, these fields have remained separated despite their
overlapping analytical and empirical parameters.
Beyond specialized scholarship and practice, however, the Article seeks to
comment on broader political debates over the sensitive topic of immigration.
These debates too often portray migration influxes as exogenous phenomena, as
opposed to effects of law and policy choices made by government actors in trade,
investment, and related areas.
In conclusion, this analysis emphatically does not oppose economic
globalization, but rather seeks to delineate and make explicit the full range of its
social effects. Doing so hopefully draws attention to the importance of
incorporating those effects into any framework of analysis for economic
globalization. NAFTA displaced agricultural workers in Mexico and caused
flows of surplus labor into Mexican cities, maquiladoras, and ultimately the
United States. This sudden increase in labor supply generated practical
implications for labor practices in both Mexico and the United States, creating
additional supply and vulnerability on the part of workers. Moreover, the relative
weakness in both national and international labor protections, in terms of the
enforcement of labor standards and the provision for labor "adjustment,"
exacerbated the vulnerability of this excess labor supply.
The delineation of this dynamic also demonstrates the futility of many of the
immigration reforms currently under consideration in the United States debate.
Simply "tightening the border" cannot be expected to stem the flow of dislocated
workers and families from Mexico when that flow arises out of the deeply-rooted
dynamics of globalization described above.
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Moreover, it is important for policy makers, commentators, and other
participants in the immigration debate to understand the interconnectedness of
immigration issues and international economic policies that the United States has
actually pursued. Both NAFTA and the macroeconomic liberalization preceding
it were reforms that were actively supported by leadership in the U.S.
government, as well as in international economic institutions, such as the IMF, in
which the United States played a leading role. In other words, illegal immigration
may represent a problem of "unintended consequences" insofar as U.S.
international economic policy is concerned.
The role of international economic liberalization, and of the United States in
supporting it, generates both empirical and ethical reasons for caution in
considering the viability of a "crackdown" on undocumented labor in this
country. Ethically, in my view, such measures may also be questionable when the
dynamics that created the problem have been generated by a broader
international policy context that the United States has actively supported-that of
economic liberalization.

